The Supreme Court and the Press: Freedom or Privilege? by Bradley, Sandra
The University of Akron
IdeaExchange@UAkron
Akron Law Review Akron Law Journals
July 2015
The Supreme Court and the Press: Freedom or
Privilege?
Sandra Bradley
Please take a moment to share how this work helps you through this survey. Your feedback will be
important as we plan further development of our repository.
Follow this and additional works at: http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Evidence Commons, First Amendment Commons,
and the Privacy Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Akron Law Journals at IdeaExchange@UAkron, the
institutional repository of The University of Akron in Akron, Ohio, USA. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Akron Law Review by an authorized administrator of IdeaExchange@UAkron. For more information, please
contact mjon@uakron.edu, uapress@uakron.edu.
Recommended Citation
Bradley, Sandra (1979) "The Supreme Court and the Press: Freedom or Privilege?," Akron Law Review: Vol. 12 : Iss.
2 , Article 3.
Available at: http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol12/iss2/3
SYMPOSIM: COMMENT
THE SUPREME COURT AND THE PRESS:
FREEDOM OR PRIVILEGE?
INTRODUCTION
I N 1971, a catalog of personal liberties was ratified by the states and
adopted as the first ten amendments to the new Constitution of the United
States. The Bill of Rights guaranteed in writing that the citizens of the new
nation would have freedoms not previously provided by their colonial rulers.
It began in part with the assurance that "Congress shall make no law...
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press...."I
One hundred eighty-seven years later, the Supreme Court of the United
States, in a series of opinions in the spring of 1978, declared that the "free-
dom" guaranteed by the first amendment was not necessarily synonymous
with the "privilege" sought by the press. Nor, the Court seemed to declare,
was it prevented by the prohibition against abridgement of the press from
limiting the rights of the press to those held generally by the public.
The common refrain in the 1978 decisions is that the first amendment
guarantees no greater rights to the press than to other citizens; that the press
is but one of countless categories of Americans protected by, and subject to,
the Constitution, with no greater protection than any other category, and
that the first amendment is directed only at prohibiting the prior restraint of
the press.
The limited application of the first amendment and the narrow view
of the intent of its framers was reflected most sharply in the Court's decision
that newsrooms could be made the subject of search warrants in criminal
investigations despite possible disruption of the flow of news and interference
with legitimate newsgathering processes.' The Court also held that members
of the news media had no greater right of access to prisons than other citi-
zens, thereby blocking a television station's attempts to investigate allegations
of prisoner mistreatment in a California prison.' The Court stopped short of
stiffing press investigations altogether, holding that newspapers could not
be prohibited from reporting on confidential inquiries into the conduct of a
state judge, but in doing this, the Court rested its analysis on a balancing test
I U.S. CoNST., amend. I.
2Zrcher v. Stanford Daily, 98 S. CL 1970 (1978), discussed infra, Part 11.
3 Houchins v. KQED, 98 S. Ct. 2588 (1978), discussed infra, Part M A.
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which, in that particular case, tipped in favor of the press.' The common
thread of the cases remained a balancing of interests, the Court asking itself
in each case whether the interest of the press was outweighed by counter-
vailing societal interests.' The scale appeared to tip heavily against the press.
The Court's attitude towards the press as reflected in its construction
of the first amendment was expressed as much in what the Court chose not
to do as in what it did. Asked to stay a contempt of court finding against a
New York Times reporter who refused to turn over his notes in a criminal
investigation, Justices White and Marshall both denied the request, stating
they did not believe a majority of the Court would vote to grant certiorari
to hear the newspaper's case.' Reporter Myron Farber went to jail after tho
case was returned to the state court. On a later appeal, the Supreme Court
did, in fact, refuse to hear the case.!
The press was especially quick to react to the Court's stance in Zurcher
v. Stanford Daily, terming it a blow to freedom of the press and a threat
to the democratic process.8 Congress responded quickly as well, with the
introduction of several bills directed at third party searches in general and
4 Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 98 S. Ct. 1535, discussed infra, Part III B.
Old. at 1542.
eNew York Times Co. v. Jascalevich, 99 S. Ct. 6 (1978).
7 Id. New York Times reporter Myron Farber was sentenced to an indefinite jail term after
he was found in contempt for refusing to turn over his notes from the investigation of a
doctor on trial in New Jersey on charges of murdering five patients. See Piercing a News-
man's "Shield", TIME, Aug. 7, 1978, at 74; Reporter Begins Indefinite Jail Term for Con-
tempt of Court, Aug. 5, 1978, at 15 (from a UPI dispatch same date); Times Continues Ap-
peals to Keep Reporter Free, EDITOR & PUBLISHER, Aug. 5, 1978, at 11; What Is a Shield
Law?, EDrroR & PUBLISHER, July 29, 1978, at 6; Times Fights to Keep Reporter Out of Jail,
EDITOR & PUBLISHER, July 29, 1978, at 9; Justices Allow Subpoena for News Files to Stand,
EDrroR & PUBLISHER, July 15, 1978, at 9; Legal Battle for Reporters Notes Continues, EDrroR
& PUBLISHER, July 8, 1978, at 10; Judge Orders Reporter to Surrender Notes, EDrroR & PUB-
LISHER, June 17, 1978, 11.
8 See Irving Dilliard, adviser to National News Council, concurring statement issued Sept.
12, 1978, to National News Council's "Statement on Search and Seizure," (June 27, 1978),
in CoLUm. JouRNALIsM REV., Nov.-Dec. 1978, at 98. ("I have been following the Supreme
Court's Bill of Rights decisions for more than fifty years. In all that time, I know of no
decision that is more in step with police state conduct that this one .... [Unannounced police
raids] have no place in our constitutional democracy or our system of justice"); statement
of Richard Salant, President of CBS News, to ABA panel on "Search and Seizure of the
Media," that there was "no question" that newsgathering would be affected by the decision,
47 U.S.L.W. 2126 (Aug. 22, 1978); address by Allen H. Neuharth, chairman and president,
American Newspaper Publishers Assoc. to ANPA conference June 5, 1978: "The decision
... subjecting newspaper offices to ransacking puts a sledgehammer in the hands of those
who would batter the American people's First Amendment rights. It authorizes harrassment
and intimidation of the public's right to know ... ." See also Rule of Rummage Decision,
EDITOR AND PUBLISHER, July 29, 1978, at 40; Keep Out: Another Rebuff for Newsmen, TIm,
[Vol. 12:2
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at searches of newsrooms in particular. ' The Senate Judiciary Subcommittee
on the Constitution began hearings June 22, 1978, less than a month after
the Zurcher decision was announced, to take testimony from representatives
of the news media on the potential impact of the court-sanctioned newsroom
searches.1" Of major concern to the press was that the decisions authorizing
newsroom searches and requiring reporters to turn over notes, even for in
camera inspections by the courts, could seriously impair the newsgathering
process, thereby inhibiting a free flow of the news. Confidential news sources
upon whom the news media relied for information not readily available to
the general public would "dry up" newsmen warned, once they learned their
identities could be revealed during searches of newsroom files and examina-
tions of reporters' notes.1 Nor did the press miss the significance of the deci-
sions in light of investigations and disclosures published by the media in
recent years. One editor was said to proclaim that both the Vietnam War
disclosures and the Watergate investigations could have been severely
hampered, if not totally prevented, by the seizure of the Pentagon Papers
during a newsroom search, and by "harrassment" through search warrant
procedures in general.' 2
This comment will examine the Supreme Court's spring, 1978 decisions
July 10, 1978, at 73 (quoting Jack Landau, director of the Reporters Committee for
Freedom of the Press: "The court feels the press is arrogant and greedy and powerful
enough to get what it wants without help from the court. But most of the press is not
the big, rich, influential media that the Justices see in Washington, and all those local re-
porters do need support from the court to do their job."); Your Newsroom May Be Searched,
THE QUILL, July/August 1978 at 21; Comment: Another Turn of the Screw, COLUM. JouR-
NmAmM REv., July/August 1978 at 22 ("it is disconcerting to find in the language of the
[Zurcher] decision further evidence that the Supreme Court majority is seeking to minimize
the functions of the press, not to mention the Bill of Rights, in American Society."); News-
paper Editors Rap High Court Search Ruling, EDITOR & PUBLISHER, June 17, 1978, at 9.
9 At least six bills were introduced in the House and Senate, although no action was taken on
any of them before the Congress adjourned. See Two Bills Introduced to Protect News Files,
EDITOR & PUBLISHER, June 10, 1978, at 9; Your Newsroom May Be Searched, THE QUELL,
July/Aug. 1978, at 25; Congress Ponders New Search Legislation, EDITOR & PUBLISHER,
July 8, 1978, at 8 ("At least half a dozen measures have now been introduced..."). The
administration also responded to the decision by ordering a review by the White House
and the Justice Department of all legislation introduced as a result of the Zurcher decision.
See Mondale Hints Carter Will Seek Search Safeguards, EDITOR & PUBLISHER, June 24, 1978,
at 7; Words of Encouragement from the Vice-President, THE QUELL, July/Aug. 1978, at 14.
10 See The Impact of the U.S. Supreme Court's Decision in Zurcher v. Stanford Daily and
Corrective Legislation Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the Senate Judiciary
Comm., 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978). Congress Hears Media on Search Ruling, EDITOR &
PUBLISHER, July 29, 1978, at 13; 'Rule-of-Rummage' Decision, EDITOR & PUBLISHER, July 29,
1978, at 40.
11 See, e.g., Subcommittee testimony, supra note 10; Comment, supra note 8, at 22; Scared of
What Might Happen, THE QUELL, July/Aug. 1978, at 2; see also 98 S. Ct. 1970, 1986 (Stewart,
J., dissenting); Stanford Daily v. Zurcher, 353 F. Supp. 124, 127 and 135 (E.D. Calif. 1972).
12 Comment, supra note 8, quoting Benjamin C. Bradlee, editor, The Washington Post, at 22.
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as they affected first amendment rights, and will assess their impact upon the
press. Particular emphasis will be placed on Zurcher v. Stanford Daily as
it affects first amendment, as well as fourth amendment, protections.
I. DIVERGENT VIEWS OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT
The simple statement "Congress shall make no law .. , abridging...
the freedom of the press" has prompted differences of opinion over its mean-
ing since the ink with which it was penned was barely dry.
Were the framers merely prohibiting federal legislation restraining
the gathering and publication of news? Was the act of placing the mandate
in the first of the ten amendments in the Bill of Rights indicative of a greater
weight to be given to that directive, or a mere matter of convenience in
drafting? If its object was to prevent prior restraint of publication, what was
embodied in the phrase "prior restraint"? Did it refer only to a prohibition
against taxation and official censorship? Or did it have a more subtle mean-
ing, prohibiting indirect acts as well as those which would have the long
range effect of restraining the publication of news?"
Clearly, the concern at the time of the drafting of the amendment grew
from the criminal libel laws imposed upon the colonies by the Crown of
England. A half-century before the drafting of the amendment, a jury had
voted for the acquittal of printer John Peter Zenger in the celebrated trial
in which Zenger's attorney argued for truth as a defense to the charge that
Zenger had criminally libeled the governor of New York." Zenger's acquit-
tal, however, did not settle the issue. In 1791, the states were still debating
the truth-as-a-defense question. The Massachusetts courts were divided on
the issue, but agreed with the Pennsylvania courts that a state constitutional
guarantee of a free press meant no more than a prohibition against licensing."
Thomas Jefferson proposed a state constitutional free press provision for
Virginia which prohibited prior restraint of the press, while establishing the
13 For a discussion of the debate over the meaning and intent of the press clause, see H.
CROSS, TIM PEOPLE'S RIGHT TO KrNOw, (1953); Z. CHAFFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNrED
STATES, (1941); Z. CHAFFE, GOVERNMENT AND MASS COMMUNICATIONS, (1947); W. HACH-
TEN, THE SUPREME COURT ON FREEDOM OP THE PRESS, (1968); A. MEEJOHN, FREE
SPEECH AND ITS RELATON TO SELF-GovERNMENT, (1948); Benzanson, The New Free Press
Guarantee, 63 VA. L. REV. 731 (1977); Bowers, Jefferson and the Bill of Rights, 41 VA. L
REv. 709 (1955); Lange, The Speech and Press Clauses, 33 UCLA L REv. 77 (1975); Nim-
mer, Is Freedom of the Press a Redundancy: What Does It Add to Freedom of Speech? 26
HASTINGS L.J. 639 (1975); Comment, The Right of the Press to Gather Information After
Branzburg and Pell, 124 U. PA. L. REv. 166 (1975).
14 L. LEVY, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS FROM ZENGER TO JEFFERSON, at 44 (1967).
's Id. at liii.
[Vol. 12:2
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liability of the press for false publication. The implied truth-as-a-defense
provision was recommended to James Madison as a federal constitutional
amendment, but while Madison reportedly regarded it as a provision that
"ought to be well considered," he did not include it in the final draft of the
amendment."
Nor did Madison urge that the Congress include in the draft a Virginia
proposal freeing the press from abridgement "by any authority of the United
States.""' Madison's draft then could be read as meaning no more than what
it said: Congress could pass no laws abridging the freedom of the press.
But the construction of the amendment has not been that simple. There
developed two distinct views on construction of the free press provision, one
side arguing for a balancing approach and the other maintaining the "pre-
ferred freedom" view, i.e., that first amendment rights take priority over all
other constitutional guarantees.' 8 One strong proponent of the preferred
freedom view was Justice Hugo Black, who maintained that the first amend-
ment was unequivocal and that its freedoms were wholly "beyond reach"
of any federal authority.' 9 Representing the balancing view was Justice Felix
Frankfurter, who argued that the competing interests of free speech and
national security demand a "candid and informed weighing" of the interests."0
The writers have viewed a guarantee of a free press as essential to a
democracy. Observing that citizens can no longer "assemble in the markets"
to learn the news as did our forebears in simpler times, Francis Lieber wrote:
"the journals are to modern freemen what the agora was to the Athenian, the
forum to the Roman."'" And DeTocquevile, observing the phenomenon of
American democracy in 1835, commented that "the sovereignty of the people
16Id. at liv; see also 5 WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 269 (Hunt ed. 1904); Bowins, supra
note 13; see generally MASS MEDIA AND THE SUPREME COURT 14-15 (K. Devol ed. 1976).
11 L. LEvy, supra note 14, at Iv.
isW. HACITEN, THE SUPREME COURT ON FREEDOM OF THE PRESS at 13 (1968); Sheppard v.
Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966); see, e.g., LETTERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, cited in Bridges v.
California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941); see generally MAss MEDIA AND THE SUPREME COURT, supra
note 16; Media and the First Amendment in a Free Society, 60 GEo. L.J. 1068, nn.1141,
1144 (1972).
'9W. HACHTEN, supra note 18, at 13; see Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959), 314 U.S.
252.
20 W. HAcrTEN, supra note 18, at 13; see Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
21 H. NELSON, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS FROM HAMILTON TO THE WARREN COURT at 378
(1967). For discussions of the press as a marketplace of ideas, see, e.g., Red Lion Broadcasting
v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 395 U.S. 367 (1969); Time Inc. v. Hill, 385
U.S. 374 (1967); Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945); Z. CUAFFEE, Gov-
ERNMENT AND MASS COMMuNIcATIONs (1947); H. CROSS, supra note 13; A. MEIL[EJOHN,
supra note 13; F. TwuYER, LEGAL CONTROL OF THE PRESS (1956).
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and the liberty of the press may... be looked upon as correlative institu-
tions .... More recently, former Chief Justice Earl Warren observed that
citizens cannot efficiently govern themselves unless they are first fully in-
formed.23 It has also been said that a victory for a free press is a victory for
all Americans. "Freedom of the press is an individual right belonging to all
Americans. When anyone wins a victory at the bar of the Supreme Court,
it enhances and enlarges freedom for all."2
The development of a body of case law interpreting "freedom of the
press" began slowly and gained little momentum until the 1960's. The early
cases demonstrated a reluctance by the courts to restrict the press except in
the most urgent circumstances.
Justice Holmes' "clear and present danger" test, under which no prior
restraint could be imposed upon the press absent a clear and present danger
to society, was set out in the World War One espionage case of Schenck v.
United States. 5 Some thirty years later, the test was modified with the intro-
duction of a balancing approach in Dennis v. United States, in which the
Court adopted the test advocated by Judge Learned Hand in the lower court:
"[I]n each case [the courts] must ask whether the gravity of the 'evil,' dis-
counted by its improbability, justifies such invasion of free speech as is neces-
sary to avoid the danger.2
The issue of prior restraint, undoubtedly because it is so near the "core"
of the first amendment, is the one area of the law on freedom of the press
where the Court has remained firm. This issue was first addressed in 1931
in the landmark case of Near v. Minnesota, where the Court examined a
state statute which provided that publications found to be "malicious,
scandalous and defamatory" could be "abated" as public nuisances. The
Court held that the statute amounted to suppression of the press and was there-
fore invalid. 7 In the 1966 case of Mills v. Alabama, the Court held invalid
a state statute which prohibited election day publication of editorials relating
22 A. DE ToCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA, 118 (2 ed. 1946).
23 Warren, Governmental Secrecy: Corruption's Ally, 60 A.B.AJ. 550 (1974).
24 W. HACHTEN, supra note 18, at 6.
25 Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919) ("clear and present danger" test applied
to leaflets sent to members of the military during World War I by officer of the Socialist
Party urging resistance to military conscription).
2r 341 U.S. 494.
27Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931); see also New York Times v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254 (1966) ("truth-as-a-defense" doctrine revived in libel actions; proof of actual malice
held to be preferred alternative to statutory control); Grosjean v. American Press, 297
U.S. 233 (1936) (Louisiana tax on newspapers and magazines held discriminatory and in-
tended as a means of controlling the press).
[Vol. 12:2
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to pertinent election issues, finding the statute an "obvious and flagrant
abridgement of the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of the press. "28
The Court's prior restraint position was again tested in 1971, when the
Justice Department sought to enjoin publication of the "Pentagon Papers"
by the New York Times and the Washington Post. The government based
its case for the injunction on national security grounds, arguing that dis-
closure of the classified federal documents could undermine the nation's
position in the Vietnam War. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court, in a brief
per curiam opinion held that the government had failed to meet the "heavy
burden" necessary to justify such a prior restraint.2 It did not, however,
reach this conclusion easily, as evidenced by the five concurring opinions and
three dissenting opinions accompanying the decision. The dissenters objected
to the speed of the decision, noting that in light of the fact that the Times
had withheld publication of the documents for three months while preparing
its stories, brief further delays for a trial on the merits would do no additional
harm to the people's right to know. 0 In an opinion which seemed to foretell
the Court's balancing view of the first amendment in the years to come, Justice
Blackmun stated that, "the First Amendment, after all, is only one part of
an entire Constitution.... What is needed here is a weighing ... of the broad
right of the press to print and of the very narrow right of the government to
prevent ....
Tension was also growing in the decade between the mid-1960s and
1970s over conflicting first amendment and sixth amendment rights. In 1966,
Dr. Sam Sheppard was granted a new trial twelve years after his conviction
for the highly publicized murder of his wife in the Cleveland suburb of Bay
Village. It was with some apparent reluctance, however, that the Court found
the scales tipped in favor of Sheppard's sixth amendent rights to a fair trial;
the majority observed that such an imbalance should be found only where
there is a "serious and substantial" threat of harm.32 Ten years later, the
Court was again faced with the free press/fair trial conflict in Nebraska Press
Association v. Stuart." The point of contention was a "gag" order issued
against the news media in a criminal trial. The Court rested its decision on
28 Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214 (1966).
2 gNew York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971); discussed in Benzanson, supra
note 13, at 763; Note, New York Times Co. v. United States: Confrontation Between Press
and Presidential Power, 20 LOYOLA L. REv. 140 (1973-74), Ervin, Media and the First
Amendment in a Free Society, 60 GEO. LJ. 871, 916 (1972); see also Landau, Free at Last,
at Least, in MAss MEDIA AN THE SUPREME COURT, supra note 16, at 61; The MEDIA AND
THE LAw (H. Simons and J. Califano ed. 1976).
30403 U.S. 713.
3 lid. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
32 384 U.S. 333; see also 314 U.S. 252.
a3 Nebraska Press Assoc. v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
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prior restraint grounds and found the order invalid, but did not overlook
the free press/fair trial conflict entirely. It pointedly observed that no para-
mount rights inhere in the first amendment, and that under appropriate cir-
cumstances the scales could tip in the other direction?
The subtle shift in the Court's attitude toward the press was equally appar-
ent in the cases dealing with the press' right of access to the news. In the 1965
case of Estes v. Texas, which also involved free press/fair trial issues, the
Court said positively that "all [reporters] are entitled to the same rights as the
general public;"35 it expressed the same view in the negative nine years later in
the prison access cases of Pell v. Procunier6 and Saxbe v. Washington Post,"
that reporters are entitled to no greater access than members of the general
public.
The greatest point of contention in the free press debate has been over
the reporters' claimed privilege against disclosure of confidential sources and
notes, the claim resting upon a view of newsgathering as an essential and
protected element of first amendment free press rights. While at least one
circuit court declared as early as 1958 that newsgathering was not protected
under the first amendment, 8 the Supreme Court avoided comment on the
issue until 1972 in the landmark case of Branzburg v. Hayes." There, in a
trilogy of cases involving newsmen who had refused to disclose sources or
turn over notes to grand juries," the Court addressed the twin issues of privi-
lege and newsgathering, concluding that the first amendment did not en-
compass an absolute privilege for newsmen. While holding that the three
reporters had no right to withhold the information, the Court, however, left
the door open for the states to provide a reporter's privilege by statute.
On the broader issue of newsgathering, the Branzburg decision created
an ambiguity which has yet to be resolved. While rejecting arguments for
34 Id. The Court states, 'The authors of the Bill of Rights did not undertake to assign priori-
ties as between First Amendment and Sixth Amendment rights . . . . It is unnecessary, after
nearly two centuries, to establish a priority applicable in all circumstances."
35Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965).
3
6 Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974).
37 Saxbe v. Washington Post, 417 U.S. 843 (1974); see generally THE MEDIA AND THE LAW,
note 29 supra, at 11.
"8 See Garland v. Torre, 259 F.2d 545 (2d Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 910. This was
a libel suit by singer Judy Garland against a CBS correspondent; the identity of the source
was held to go to the "heart of the claim" and must be disclosed. The opinion was written
by then Judge Potter Stewart. See generally THE MEDIA AND THE LAW supra note 29, at 11.
39 Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
40 In Branzburg v. Hayes, the reporter was subpoenaed to testify about drug violations
he had witnessed in the course of his research for a story. In In re Pappas, the reporter
was ordered to turn over information acquired in a personal visit to Black Panther head-
quarters. The reporter in United States v. Caldwell was subpoenaed to disclose the identity
of informants and confidential information from an investigation of the Black Panthers.
[Vol. 12:2
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a first amendment privilege, the Court observed that "newsgathering is not
without its first amendment protections.. . ."" Branzburg has been cited
both for and against the proposition that newsgathering is a constitutionally
protected right. The most recent evidence of that conflict can be seen in the
opinions of the district court and the Supreme Court in Zurcher v. Stanford
Daily, discussed in the following section.
II. POLICE IN THE NEWSROOM
On the afternoon of April 12, 1971, members of the Palo Alto, Cali-
fornia police department, armed with a search warrant, entered the office
of the Stanford Daily, the student newspaper of Stanford University. They
were searching for negatives, film and photographs alleged to constitute
evidence of an April 9 confrontation between police and demonstrators
at the Stanford University hospital."2 Although the "quite thorough" search
of the student newspaper offices included searches of file cabinets and re-
porters' desks, it produced only those photographs which had appeared in
the newspaper the previous day. '
The police left the Stanford Daily office empty-handed that day, but
their search was fruitful in the long run. Although it failed to produce hard
evidence for one investigation, the search opened the doors for those to come.
Seven years and one month after the Stanford Daily search, the United States
Supreme Court ruled in a close but nonetheless binding decision that search
warrants could be executed against innocent third parties in general and
newspapers in particular."
The newspaper responded to the search with an action in the federal
district court under 28 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that its civil rights under the
first and fourth amendments had been violated.4" The thrust of the news-
paper's objection was that in conducting the search, the officers had had
access to reporters' notes containing confidential information supplied by
sources whose identity had not been made public, and the granting of official
access to these materials would have revealed the identities of confidential
news sources, thus endangering future newsgathering efforts. 6 A former
41 408 U.S. 665. The Branzburg trilogy has been discussed extensively. See, e.g., MASS MEDIA
AM THE SUPREME COURT, supra note 29, at 12, 23-24; Benzanson, supra note 13, at 759-61;
Comment, The Journalist's Prerogative of Non-Disclosure: Fact or Fantasy?, 20 LOYOLA L.
REv. 120, 128, 131, 135 (1973-74).
42 98 S. Ct. at 1974; 353 F. Supp. at 126.
43 98 S. Ct. at 1974; 353 F. Supp. at 127.
44 98 S. Ct. 1970. The case was decided by a vote of 5-3, with Justices White, Burger,
Blackmun, Rehnquist and Powell voting for reversal of the lower court decision, and
Justices Stewart, Marshall, and Stevens dissenting. Justice Brennan took no part in the
decision.
45 Id. at 1974.
46 353 F. Supp. at 127, 136.
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Stanford Daily editor later wrote that following the police search, staff
photographers were harrassed when they attempted to photograph other
demonstrations and office policies on the use of the newspaper's files had to
be changed. "7
In granting declaratory relief, the district court held that search war-
rants for materials in the possession of third parties could not issue in the
absence of a showing of probable cause to believe that the materials would
be destroyed, or that a subpeona duces tecum, the usual procedure for ac-
quiring evidence from third parties, would be impractical. Grounds for such
a belief, the district court maintained, would have to be shown through affi-
davits submitted to the magistrate from whom the search warrant was
sought."8 Most important to the newspaper's interest and its first amendment
claim, the district court concluded that the first amendment had been held
to modify the fourth amendment "to the extent that extra protections may
be required when first amendment interests are involved."' 9
In reaching its conclusion, the district court rejected the defendants'
reliance on Branzburg v. Hayes for the proposition that the first amendment
did not protect newsgathering.5 ° The Court, in fact, used Branzburg to its
own end to argue (1) that newsgathering was a protected element under
the first amendment and (2) that subpoenas, as opposed to ex parte search
warrants, granted newspapers access to the courts to protest threatened
seizure of confidential materials through the device of a motion to quash.51
The Court felt that the issuance of a search warrant ex parte afforded no
opportunity for the newspaper in an adversarial setting to object to the search
or to present its arguments on first amendment grounds, or otherwise, for
that objection. It "deprives the newspaper and newsman of that 'judicial con-
trol' thought so essential in Branzburg."5
The district court was no more sympathetic to the defendants' claim
that Warden v. Hayden" compelled the conclusion that third parties were
entitled to no greater protections than suspects in the search for evidence of
a crime. The defendants argued that in reversing the line of cases prohibiting
the use of warrants for "mere evidence," the Supreme Court in Warden
authorized searches of any place where any evidence of a crime might be
found. The district court disagreed, viewing Warden as focusing "on what
47 Your Newsroom May be Searched, THE QuML, supra note 9, at 24; see also 353 F. Supp.
at 136.
48 353 F. Supp. 124.
4 Id. at 124.
5o Id. at 133.
51 Id. at 133-34, citing 408 U.S. 665.
52 1d. at 130, 136.
53 Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
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may be seized, rather than who may be made the subject of a warrant."",
The Court's position was that the only effect of Warden was to strike down
the "mere evidence" rule as it related to suspects, and that it did not operate
to expand search warrant powers to innocent third parties.
Instead the Court looked to the Ninth Circuit's decision in Bacon v.
United States," and compared that holding as to arrest warrants for material
witnesses with the third party search situation. Since Bacon held that it was
necessary to show probable cause that a subpoena would be impractical in
securing the presence of a material witness before an arrest warrant could
issue, and since "historically, the right against unlawful seizures has if any-
thing been more protected.., than the right against unlawful arrest,"5 it
followed, said the court, that the stringent probable cause requirement must
be followed in the third party search area as well.
Any cause for celebration by the press over the district court's decision
and its affirmance by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals,57 was shortlived.
On May 31, 1978, the Supreme Court, in a five to three decision, reversed
the district and circuit courts. 8 The fourth and fourteenth amendments did
not prohibit third party searches, said the Court, noting that the critical
element in a search was the "thing" sought and not the owner of property
subject to the search. Nor were first amendment interests endangered by
third party searches. The Supreme Court concluded that the probable cause
and reasonableness requirements for the issuance of search warrants under
the fourth amendment provided the necessary safeguards against threats to
newspapers' rights to gather and publish the news. 9
The majority was clearly unconvinced that the threat of newsroom
searches would cause confidential sources to have second thoughts about
talking to the news media, or that journalists would resort to a self-imposed
censorship out of a fear of possible searches. Seeing no hard evidence that
newsroom searches had increased since the Stanford Daily search, the Court
concluded that there had been no abuse of the search warrant powers, and
54 353 F. Supp. at 130.
55 Bacon v. United States, 449 F.2d 933 (9th Cir. 1971).
56353 F. Supp. at 130.
57 Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 550 F.2d 464 (9th Cir. 1977).
58 98 S. Ct. 1970.
59 1d. at 1972, 1977, citing Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 158-59 (1925). 'The
right to search and the validity of the seizure are not dependent on the right to arrest.
They are dependent on the reasonable cause the seizing officer has for believing that the
contents . . . offend against the law."
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it would not deal with such abuse as a potentiality only. "[I]f abuse occurs,
there will be time enough to deal with it."60
By reaching its conclusion, the Court was able to state that newsroom
searches, actual or threatened, imposed no prior restraints on the news media
which could fall within the prohibitions of the first amendment." In so doing,
the Court echoed its finding in Branzburg where Justice White, the author of
both the Zurcher and Branzburg opinions, observed that there was no evidence
of any abuse of power by a grand jury in its efforts to question a newsman
in a criminal investigation.62 Clearly, the Court intended in Zurcher, as it
intended six years earlier in Branzburg, to deal with questions of abuse and
their concomitant threats to first amendment interests only on a case by
case basis, and then only where clear and actual abuse was evident. As
Justice White observed in Branzburg, a blanket extension of a constitutional
privilege to newsmen beyond strict interpretations of first amendment prohibi-
tions against restraint was something which the Court did not want, or intend,
to create. "The administration of a newsman's constitutional privilege would
present practical and conceptual difficulties of a high order."6
The Zurcher Court prefaced its conclusion that newsroom searches
posed no threat of prior restraint with an examination of the climate in which
the Bill of Rights had been written. The Court acknowledged that the Bill of
Rights, and particularly the fourth amendment, developed from the "conflict
between the Crown and the press,"" and a fear that the powers of search and
seizure, if left unchecked, would stifle free expression." The Court then took
the narrow view that, despite the framers' concern that searches could endanger
the right of free expression, the fourth amendment did not expressly forbid
search warrants in areas protected by the first amendment, nor did it expressly
provide special protections in those areas. The Court concluded that in gen-
eral, the search warrant requirements provided the necessary protection
against abuse by imposing the probable cause test and permitting warrants
to be issued only by magistrates.66
so ld. at 1982; but see Scared of What Might Happen, Tim QuiLL, supra note 11 (at least 14
other search warrants executed since the Stanford Daily search); Your Newsroom May be
Searched, THE QUILL, supra note 9, at 23 (at least 14 police searches of newsrooms since
the Stanford Daily search); How to Cope With Newsroom Search Warrants, EIToR & PuB-
LiSHER, July 29, 1978, at 17 (15 incidents of media searches since 1970).
61 98 S. Ct. at 1982. The Court states, "and surely a warrant to search newspaper premises
for criminal evidence . .. carries no threat of prior restraint or any direct restraint what-
soever on the publication of the Daily or on its communication of ideas." (emphasis added).
62 408 U.S. at 685, 688, 701.
63 Id. at 703-04.
64 98 S. Ct. at 1981, citing Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 482 (1965); see also Marcus v.
Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717 (1961).
65 Id. citing 367 U.S. at 729. The Court explained that the "unrestricted power of search and
seizure could also be an instrument for stifling liberty of expression."
66 1d. at 1981.
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With the majority's assumption that all magistrates would always be
impartial, that all prosecutors would attempt to search newsrooms only with
probable cause to believe they would find evidence which could be removed
or destroyed before the subpoena process could be completed, lies the fatal
flaw in its reasoning. The majority assumed that the "rational prosecutor"
would employ subpoenas, rather than searches, where a subpoena would
suffice."' It assumed that magistrates would consider the dangers of interfer-
ence with the publication schedules of newspapers in examining the reason-
ableness of the warrant, and that operating under properly specific and
reasonable warrants, police would not have cause to "rummage" through
newspaper files." But what of warrants which are not properly specific? And
how can even the most reasonable warrant specify where in the disorder of
a newsroom a particular document is to be found? The district court observed
that newspaper offices were generally "much more disorganized" than other
professional offices and that any search would necessarily entail "rummaging"
through drawers and files, 9 a statement with which not only journalists but
anyone who has visited a typical newsroom would have to agree. Even re-
porters intimately acquainted with their newsrooms have on occasion had to
resort to "rummaging" in order to find needed documents. In the Court's
opinion, if "properly administered," the prerequisites for a search warrant
would provide sufficient protection. It apparently assumed that search war-
rant applications would always be "properly administered," or that in any
event, it would not deal with the issue of an improperly administered warrant
until it was faced with it square on, and then presumably only on the facts
of that particular case.
Even assuming that federal magistrates follow fourth amendment re-
quirements with religious zeal, the majority opinion appeared not to take
into account decisions which might imprudently be made by local judges.
Journalists have expressed fears of what would happen to newspapers which
have incurred the wrath of the local police or judiciary, noting with concern
that newsroom searches could be used as retaliatory measures for reports or
editorials with which local officials disagree."0 The editor of the Washington
Post maintained in an interview following the announcement of the Zurcher
opinion that had the ruling been in force earlier, officials could have used
search warrant techniques to prevent, or at least hinder, both the Pentagon
Papers reports and the Watergate investigations."
eT Id. at 1980.
e81d. at 1982.
69 353 F. Supp. at 134-35.
TO Subcommittee testimony, supra note 10; COLUM. JOURNALISM REv. supra note 8; What Is A
Shield Law, EDIToR & PUBLISHER, supra note 7; Scared of What Might Happen, Thn QUILL,
supra note 11.
T1 COLUM. JOURNALISM REv., supra note 8; see note 11 supra.
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The Zurcher dissenters were also concerned with the possible aftershocks
of the decision. Search warrants would allow police to "ransack" newsrooms
files, read confidential materials and disrupt publication schedules, said
Justices Stewart and Marshall. The mere knowledge that this could happen
could not help but serve as a prior restraint and would have "a deterrent
effect on the availability of confidential news sources."" Justice Stevens, in
a separate dissent, saw "extremely serious" consequences in permitting third
party searches, noting that they would allow prosecutors and police to exam-
ine privileged materials which they would otherwise be denied under the
subpoena process.73 Stevens also saw a more critical flaw in the majority's
reasoning, arguing the majority was "abdicating" the Court's responsibility
for overseeing the performance of the search warrant process. In Stevens'
opinion the majority decision contradicted the Court's long standing philos-
ophy of setting standards and acting as supervisor of the process, rather than
merely relying upon "the good judgment of the magistrate to prevent abuse."7
Justice Powell, while joining the majority to tip the vote for reversal
of the district and circuit court decisions, acknowledged the potential dangers
of the third party search warrant procedures in his concurring opinion. He
observed that the dangers were "likely to be minimal" if "the reasonableness
and particularity requirements [were]... applied."75 In this context, Justice
Powell's qualifying "if' becomes a very big word.
In maintaining that the search warrant requirements of reasonableness
and specificity provided sufficient safeguards to first amendment rights, the
majority apparently overlooked its own previous holdings calling for careful
procedural protections through the subpoena process where constitutionally
protected interests were at stake.7 6 The Court rejected the newspaper's argu-
ment that such reasoning called for a hearing where it could litigate the issue
of the state's right to the materials sought. Through the use of tight construc-
tion, the Court distinguished the obscenity cases where it had held that pro-
tected materials could not be seized without a prior adversary hearing." Those
72 98 S. Ct. at 1986 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
73 Id. at 1989 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
74 Id. n.6; see Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964).
7 98 S. Ct. at 1984 (Powell, J., concurring).
76 See id. at 1987 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Justice Stewart remarked, "The decisions of this
court establish that a prior adversary judicial hearing is generally required to assess in advance
any threatened invasion of First Amendment liberty." See, e.g., United States v. Thirty-Seven
Photographs, 402 U.S. 363 (1971); Carroll v. Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 51 (1965). See also
A Quantity of Books v. Kansas, 378 U.S. 205 (1974); Roaden v. Kentucky, 413 U.S. 496
(1972); 367 U.S. 717; 427 U.S. 539; United States v. Washington Post, 403 U.S. 713 (1971);
361 U.S. 147; Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957); Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v.
Williams, 343 U.S. 495 (1952); 314 U.S. 252.
77 98 S. Ct. at 1982, citing 378 U.S. 205.
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decisions, the majority said, merely meant that protected materials could not
be removed from circulation altogether without a prior hearing and a finding
of obscenity.78 Apparently, the Court felt that it was permissible to remove
such materials as long as they could somehow still be published. However,
if they had not been published, how could they be if they were removed to
the prosecutor's evidence locker; and if they had been published, why seize
them through the warrant process when there would be little reason at that
point for the newspaper to refuse to comply with a subpoena duces tecum?
The Court also distinguished its holding ten years earlier in Carroll v.
Princess Anne, in which it said that a restraining order imposed upon a pro-
tected area such as free expression was invalid in the absence of notice and
hearing."9 An order in "this sensitive field," the Carroll Court said, had to be
as narrow as possible to meet only the precise needs of a particular case. Most
significantly, the Court held that such a purpose could not be accomplished
without full participation by all of the parties involved. "mhe failure to in-
vite participation of the party seeking to exercise First Amendment rights ...
substantially imperils the protection which the Amendent seeks to assure.""0
The majority in Zurcher also appeared not to see the significance of the
Court's observation in Branzburg that first amendment interests were pro-
tected in the grand jury setting because "grand juries are subject to judicial
control and subpoenas to motions to quash." 1 Justice Powell in his concurring
opinion in Branzburg added that a newsman was "not without remedy" when
he believed a grand jury investigation was not being conducted in good faith,
because he had access to the court to seek a protective order. 2 In the search
warrant area, those protections dissolve. The newsman's only remedy is after
the fact. He may ultimately convince the court that the prosecutor abused
his authority, or that the materials seized or examined were, in fact, pro-
tected. But the harm will already have been done and sources whose identities
were disclosed due to the search could not then be protected. "[T]he re-
porter's loyalty to his informant is meaningless in the face of a search; should
the reporter block the search, the police will force him aside." '
An overriding public interest in law enforcement was cited by the
majority in its balancing of the interests to reach its decision in favor of the
"a Id.
7 Id. citing 393 U.S. 175. The Court held that an ex parte injunction against rallies by
National States Rights Party was incompatible with the free speech provision of the first
amendment.
80 393 U.S. 175 citing Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960); see 380 U.S. 51; Bantam
Books v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58 (1963).
82 408 U.S. 665. The Court stated, "We do not expect the courts will forget that grand
juries must operate within the limits of the First Amendment as well as the Fifth."
82 Id. at 710 (Powell, J., concurring).
I8 Note, Search and Seizure and the Media, 28 STrN. L. REv. 957, 990 (1976).
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third party search warrant. Because of this "fundamental" public interest,
the majority felt that search warrants should not be suppressed "on the basis
of surmise and without solid evidence supporting the change." 8' Apparently
in the majority's opinion, the newspaper's first amendment arguments, its
fears of losing its confidential sources, and its concern with the possible dis-
ruption of the publication process during a police searcp, all amounted to no
more than "surmise." When valuable sources do turn away, when publication
schedules are seriously impeded, and when first amendment guarantees are
effectively trammeled, that, the Court seems to say, will be "time enough"
to consider the issue. In the interim, the balance apparently will continue
to tip in favor of the problems of law enforcement in the present.
Philosophical arguments and potentialities aside, a strong question arises
as to whether such strong societal interests were even present in the facts of
the Zurcher case. Justice Stewart points out in his dissent that there was no
emergency requiring the issuance of a search warrant to protect life or prop-
erty; the search did not involve contraband or fruits of a crime; and there
was no indication that the newspaper would not have responded to a sub-
poena.85 In fact, the district court noted that the county grand jury met the
very day of the search, only two hours after the search warrant was executed."
Although it would only have meant a two hour delay, the prosecutor appar-
ently did not first attempt to secure the evidence through a subpoena duces
tecum.
III. THE COURT SHOWS CONSISTENCY
A. Barring the prison gates
On June 26, 1978, nearly one month after the Zurcher v. Stanford
Daily decision was handed down, the Supreme Court reasserted its position
that the press was entitled to no greater privileges than the rest of society.
In Houchins v. KQED the Court held, again in a split decision, that the news
media have no greater right of access to prisons than do other members of
the public."
The television station which sought access to the maximum security
wing of a county jail argued for a constitutionally protected right to gather
news, maintaining the Court had upheld such a right in previous cases.8 But
while the station, and apparently the lower courts, thought the central issue
84 98 S. Ct. at 1979.
85 Id. at 1986 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
86 353 F. Supp. at 127.
8? 98 S. Ct. 2588 (1978). The vote was 4-3 on the decision, with Justices Burger, White,
Rehnquist and Stewart voting for reversal of the lower court, and Justices Stevens, Brennan
and Powell dissenting. Justices Marshall and Blackmun took no part in the decision.
88 Id.; see, e.g., 408 U.S. 665; 417 U.S. 817; see also 384 U.S. 214; 297 U.S. 233.
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of the case was the protection of newsgathering, the Supreme Court dis-
agreed. The only issue, the majority said, was whether the press had a special
right of access to the news. It concluded that it did not. 9 Once again, the
Court seemed to have dodged the crucial issue of first amendment protections
for newsgathering functions.
With echoes of the Zurcher rationale, the Court struck a balance be-
tween the societal interests in a free press and an efficient prison administra-
tion, and an interest in unimpeded administration of the prisons was found
to have the greater weight.
The Court relied heavily upon the earlier prison access case of Saxbe
v. Washington Post,9" wherein it was observed that newsmen could obtain
information on prison conditions through such means as correspondence with
prisoners and interviews with prison officials. To those means, the Court now
added another: regular reports from the State Board of Corrections.91 Pre-
sumably here, as in the case of the always-fair magistrates in Zurcher, public
officials could always be relied upon to supply all necessary information about
prison conditions, apparently even when they themselves might be responsible
for the poor conditions. The faith in the honesty and objectivity of officialdom
was not born, nor did it die, with Zurcher.
While acknowledging that the press had a constitutionally protected
right to disseminate the news, the majority in Houchins reached the anoma-
lous conclusion that there was no parallel protection for acquiring the news
to disseminate. In distinguishing those earlier cases in which it had stressed
the role of a free press in keeping the public informed," the Court now said
that what it had meant was only that the press had the freedom to "com-
municate information once it [was] obtained."9 " Referring to another decision
from the same term, " the Court said that its recent statement that the public
was entitled to information was intended only to mean that the government
could not prevent the press from publishing that information which it hap-
pened to acquire. 5
B. One narrow decision for the press
On May 1 of its 1978 term, the Supreme Court announced a seven to
zero decision which overturned a Virginia statute providing for criminal
sanctions against the press for reporting on confidential proceedings of the
89 98 S. Ct. 2588, 2596.
90 417 U.S. 843.
91 98 S. Ct. 2588, 2597.
92 Id. at 2594; see 384 U.S. 214; 297 U.S. 233.
*9 98 S. Ct. 2588, 2594.
94 98 S. Ct. 1535.
95 98 S. Ct. 2588, 2594.
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state's Judicial Inquiry and Review Commission."8 In overturning the con-
viction of a Virginia newspaper which had reported a pending inquiry of the
Commission, the Court held that there was no clear and present danger posed
by publication of the proceedings sufficient to warrant governmental encroach-
ment on first amendment rights in Landmark Communications, Inc. v.
Virginia."
The decision, however, offered no cause for belief that the Court was
adopting a liberalized attitude toward the press and the first amendment.
The Court stressed that it was addressing only the "narrow and limited ques-
tion" of the constitutionality of providing criminal sanctions against third
persons, including the press, who divulge information about the Commission's
confidential proceedings.' Since neither the issue of prior restraint nor that
of right of access to the news was directly raised in the case, the Court would
not deal with them." It also disposed of the newspaper's reliance on the
truth-as-a-defense theory as exemplified by the reasoning in New York Times
v. Sullivan,' finding that approach unnecessary for the resolution of the
case.
101
The Court instead turned to the old balancing approach, and found
that in this instance the publication subject to the state's criminal sanctions
"[lay] near the core of the First Amendment," and the state's interests in
protecting the confidentiality of judicial disciplinary proceedings was there-
fore outweighed by these first amendment interests." 2 The Court here did not
have to concern itself with the access issue because the newspaper had ac-
quired and published the information. The state's attempt to punish the news-
paper for having published the report was much too similar to the very events
which led to the drafting of the amendment."0 ' The Court had little choice;
the opinion implied that were it not for the criminal sanctions provided by
the Virginia statute, it may have upheld the act, noting that of the forty-nine
jurisdictions which have constitutional or statutory provisions for judicial over-
sight procedures, only two, Virginia and Hawaii, provided criminal sanctions
for breach of confidentiality provisions.'04 Adopting the same attitude towards
- VA. CONST. art. VI, § 10; VA. CODE §§ 2.1 -37.13.
97 98 S. Ct. 1535. The Court held that criminal sanctions against third persons, including
newspapers, who disclose information about confidential proceedings of the state judicial
review commission violate free speech and free press clauses of first amendment. Justices
Brennan and Powell did not participate in the decision.
98 Id.
99 Id.
100 283 U.S. 697.
101 98 S. Ct. 1535, 1541.
202 Id.; see, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 64-65 (1976).
10 3 See L. Lnvy, supra note 14, at liv, 44.
104 98 S. Ct. 1535, 1540, 1545.
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the access issue as it later did in Houchins, the Court further observed that
the "risk" of disclosure of Commission activities "[could] be eliminated
through careful internal procedures to protect the confidentiality" of the
proceedings. 10 5
It is difficult to see how the Court managed to avoid the prior restraint
issue, despite the fact that it had not been raised directly by the parties. If
the actual imposition of criminal sanctions upon a newspaper after publica-
tion of forbidden materials "lies near the core of the First Amendment," then
where lies the threat of criminal sanctions before publication? If one news-
paper was willing to defy the powers of the state's criminal justice system and
disobey the statute, how many other newspapers, particularly small publica-
tions with few legal or financial resources to support a confrontation in the
courts, had declined to report similar inquiries because of the statute?
Ironically, the Court used the very arguments to support its position in
Landmark that it would so carefully distinguish in the first amendment cases
to follow. The purpose of the amendment, the Court said, "was to protect
the free discussion of governmental affairs."' ° The press serves "as the hand-
maiden of effective judicial administration," the public's guardian against
injustice.'" It serves to further public awareness and discussion of govern-
ment.08 It does all these things, but apparently only within the narrow con-
fines of strict constitutional construction.
IV. THE IMPACT ON THE PRESS
Doubts about the status of newsgathering as a protected right under
the first amendment have only been deepened by the Supreme Court's recent
decisions.
The Court maintained its position that it would not decide the news-
gathering question on its face, but would instead continue to deal with the
issue on a case-by-case basis, favoring an ad hoc balancing approach to any
sweeping rule of law. As a result, the press was again left in a state of un-
certainty.
While the Court did not expressly state that newsgathering was not pro-
tected, it appeared to do so by implication in its 1978 decisions. Confidential
information in newsroom files was not protected from examination by search-
ing police officers."0" Reporters would have to rely upon the normal channels
of communication open to the general public for information on prison condi-
0 Id. at 1545.
16 id. at 1541, citing 384 U.S. 214.
'07 Id.; 384 U.S. at 550.
0l8 Id. at 1542; see 376 U.S. 254.
109 98 S. Ct. 1970.
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tions.' ' ° Judicial inquiry commissions, and presumably, other governmental
agencies, might act behind closed doors so long as they were careful not to
let the media know what they were doing."1
One legal scholar observed that the Court's 1978 opinions do no more
than declare that the press is entitled to no special treatment that is not
afforded the general public; that they do not restrain the freedom of the
press, but merely limit its privileges."' That view was also expressed by a
commentator on an earlier line of press cases, who observed that the Court
was merely adopting a position of "neutrality" towards the press when it
declined to grant special privileges."' According to the neutrality theory, the
Court, in a sense, protects the press when it denies special privilege, by in-
suring that the press will remain independent of government."'
This position, however, does not account for the framers' decision to
grant special protection to one institution, the press, along with the first
amendment's guarantees of individual rights.' 5 If the press were meant to
have no greater protection or privilege than any other citizen or institution,
the press clause would seem to be little more than surplusage. If one accepts
the view that if it is written in the Constitution, it must mean something, one
is irresistably drawn back to the newsgathering argument. The dissenters in
Houchins v. KQED pointed to Madison's position in drafting the amendment.
He felt that a popular government could not exist without popular informa-
tion "or the means of acquiring it.""' 6 Madison's view of a popular govern-
ment, they argued, "would be stripped of its substance" without a constitu-
tional protection for acquiring, as well as disseminating, the news.11 '
The perception of the press as the "eyes and ears" of the public has been
expressed by other dissenters on the Court. Justice Powell, in his dissent to
Saxbe v. Washington Post, argued that individuals alone could not acquire
all of the knowledge essential for making intelligent decisions in a democratic
system. "For most citizens, the prospect of personal familiarity with news-
worthy events is hopelessly unrealistic. In seeking out the news the press
110 98 S. Ct. 2588.
11' 98 S. Ct. 1535.
112 Commotion from the High Court?, TIE QUILL, July/Aug. 1978, at 6 quoting Philip Kur-
land, University of Chicago.
1's Benzanson, supra note 13, at 761.
114 Id.
115 Justice Potter Stewart, in a 1974 speech to the Yale Law School, noted the distinction
between the speech and press clauses and pointed out that since the press clause extends
the amendment's guarantees to an institution, it permits the institution to receive special
protections. See generally THE MEDIA AND THm LAW, supra note 29, at 24-25.





Akron Law Review, Vol. 12 [1979], Iss. 2, Art. 3
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol12/iss2/3
SYMPOSIUM: COMMENT
therefore acts as an agent of the public at large.""' 8 Justice Douglas echoed
those sentiments in a separate dissent to Saxbe v. Washington Post and Pell
v. Procunier. The average citizen, Douglas said, was not likely to investigate
prison conditions on his own by interviewing inmates, but instead was likely
to rely upon the press for that information. 119
Newsgathering was also viewed as a major societal interest by Chafee
in his discourse, Free Speech in the United States."10 Two types of interests
were embodied in the first amendment, according to Chafee. The first was the
interest of the individual in expressing his opinion on vital matters. The
second was the "societal interest in the attainment of truth" in order for the
public to acquire enough information to adopt and carry out "the wisest
course of action" for the country."'
The current majority of the United States Supreme Court appears to
view any societal interest in a free press as secondary to the greater interest
in preserving law and order and the official status quo. The public's right and
need to acquire information essential for operating an efficient democratic
government apparently goes no farther than that information which the
government would have it know.
Any illusions which remained about the first amendment harboring
"paramount" rights have been put to rest in major post-Zurcher decisions.
The dust had barely settled after the Court's declaration that the first and
fourth amendments did not protect newsrooms from police searches when
Myron Farber relied upon a New Jersey "shield" law 2' and refused to reveal
his sources in an investigation of a doctor accused of murdering his patients.
The New York Times reporter went to jail and the shield law, for all practical
purposes, had been disregarded. In New Jersey v. Jascalevich (Farber),
the New Jersey Superior Court, having already found Farber in contempt,
sentenced him to jail after two justices of the Supreme Court refused to
hear the reporter's interlocutory appeals on first amendment grounds."'
Interestingly, the Court did so after concluding that the state's shield law
was not unconstitutional and that the reporter had acted quite within his
rights in relying upon the statute. The only problem was that the statute
and the protection it gave Farber had to give way to the criminal de-
118 417 U.S. 843, 863 (Powell, J., dissenting).
19 See dissenting opinion in 417 U.S. 817; 417 U.S. 843.
120 Z. CHAFFEE, supra note 13.
221 Id.
2 N.J.S.A. §§ 2A: 84A-21, 21 a.
1
2 3 New Jersey v. Jascalevich (Farber), 78 NJ. Super. 259, 394 A.2d 330 (1978), cert. denied,
sub. nom. New York Times Co. v. New Jersey, 99 S. Ct. 241 (1978). The impact of the
Farber case was discussed by an ABA panel on the subject "Search and Seizure of the
Media," reported in 47 U.S.L.W. 2126 (Aug. 22, 1978). The Supreme Court's refusal to
Fall, 19781
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fendant's sixth amendment right to a fair trial."' What this does to the
effectiveness of the shield laws which the press had viewed as at least a
partial answer to the Branzburg dilemma was succinctly stated by the dis-
sent in the New Jersey Farber decision: "To hold that the shield law is not
applicable to a reporter who is also an investigator is to hold that the shield
law will never be applicable, since all good reporting must be investigative.'
2 5
Ohio's shield law is similar to that of New Jersey, providing an assurance
that reporters cannot be forced to reveal confidential sources. 2 ' Ohio's
statute has remained unchallenged, but in the wake of Zurcher, Houchins,
and Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, and the Farber Court's
declaration that its own state law was ineffective in the face of sixth amend-
ment challenges, it could be only a matter of time before the Ohio statute,
and others like it, begin to fall.
The sixth amendment was not the only area found to overshadow cer-
tain claimed first amendment rights. In what appeared to be a broad extension
of the Zurcher resolution of the first amendment/fourth amendment conflict,
the District of Columbia Court of Appeals held that neither the first nor the
fourth amendment had been violated by a telephone company's agreement
to turn over to federal investigators the toll call records of reporters. 2
Echoing the law and order theme of Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, the circuit
court engaged in what appeared to be a token balancing effort and concluded
that freedom to gather news was "subject to general and incidental burdens
that arise from good faith enforcement of otherwise valid criminal and civil
laws that are themselves not solely directed at curtailing the free flow of
information."' 28 The circuit court offered little more guidance here than did
the Supreme Court in Zurcher for dealing with law enforcement not con-
ducted in "good faith." It did make clear, however, that prospective relief
was not available in the absence of a showing of an imminent threat of harm
which would be irreparable and without adequate remedy at law. 29
The chances of showing "imminent harm" from a pending third party
review the Farber case may have been a blessing in disguise for the press, for while it let
stand the New Jersey court's ruling on the position of the shield law in that state, it left
untouched the shield law decisions of other states. Considering the Court's position on press
privilege in the Spring, 1978 cases, the chances of affirmance of the New Jersey decision in
Farber appeared strong.
124 Id. at 274, 394 A.2d at 337.
125 Id. at 289, 394 A.2d at 345.
126 OHio Rav. CODE ANN. § 2739.12 (Page 1954).
127 Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co.,
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subpoena are even slimmer than in the search warrant situation, where the
invasion is at least direct and newspaper employees have a chance of learning
in advance that a warrant is being sought. Like trying to prevent a police
search after the door has been kicked in, trying to quash a subpoena with
which a third party has already complied is virtually meaningless.
Where does the press go from here? Despite cries for federal legislation
to protect newspapers from Zurcher-type searches, legislation does not appear
to be the answer. It is a well-worn maxim that what Congress gives, Congress
can take away. Legislation was thought to be the answer in the concerns for
the protection of confidential sources. Myron Farber's jail term after his
reliance upon the New Jersey shield law laid that belief to rest. If shield
laws can fall before the altar of law and order, so, too, can laws prohibiting
newsroom searches.
The better approach, although perhaps not the most expedient, would
appear to lie in another try at the divided Court. The one consolation for
the press in the Zurcher decision was the fact that the Court was far from
unanimous in its conclusion. This might be an indication, though only a slight
one, that the pendulum could swing in the other direction given the proper
impetus. Newspapers faced with threats to their perceived first amendment
rights should not hesitate to press their cases before the courts. Although
this method is by no means perfect and will involve time, expense and con-
tinued uncertainty in the interim, it appears to be the only sound course
available.
CONCLUSION
The modern Court has not missed the significance of Madison's omis-
sion of the "by any authority of the United States" clause"' in the drafting
of the first amendment. Congress may still be prohibited from making laws
abridging the freedom of the press, but despite Justice Black's admonition
that the phrase "no law" means just that,' court-made law is apparently
viewed as a different matter.
The Court's balancing approach has left the area of press law in a
state of chaos and confusion. Newsmen can surmise from the recent opinions
that they still have a first amendment right and duty to inform the American
public. However, the gathering of that information is viewed as a mere privi-
lege which can be granted or taken away. The highest court of the land has
declared it a national policy that the press should be permitted to publish
ISO L. LEVY, supra, note 14.
1 Cahn, Dimensions of First Amendment "Absolutes": A Public Interview, 37 N.Y.U.L.
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only that news which it is able to find outside the closed doors and locked
files of officialdom.
If "a victory [for a free press] at the bar of the Supreme Court enhances
and enlarges freedom for all," 13- is the converse also true? Does a loss at
the bar of the Supreme Court on the issue of first amendment free press
rights diminish freedom for all?
"First Amendment freedoms can no more validly be taken away by
degrees than by one fell swoop," according to Justices Black and Douglas.'
Nor are they any less taken away by a turn of semantics, by saying that a
privilege is not a right, or that limiting is different from abridging. "Congress
shall make no law.., abridging the freedom ... of the press." The first
amendment still rings with the words. But that ring has a hollow tone to it
these days.
SANDRA BRADLEY
132 W. HATCHEN, supra note 18, at 6.
133 417 U.S. 817 (Douglas J., dissenting).
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
First Amendment * Freedom of Speech
Broadcasting * Obscenity
FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 98 S. Ct. 3026 (1978).
tj WAS THINKING about the curse words and the swear words, the cuss
L words and the words you can't say . . . the words you couldn't say
on the public, ah, airwaves... the ones that will curve your spine [and]
grow hair on your hands .... -1 While this is the satiric opinion of George
Carlin, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) 2 and a bare ma-
jority of the United States Supreme Court have embraced it as their genuine
opinion.' They have decided to protect the public from the fate of hearing
Carlin's social criticism regarding seven "dirty" words.'
Humorist George Carlin was recorded in a live performance in which
he made the above quoted and other statements. He went on to analyze cur-
' Reference should be made to the appendix of the Court's opinion where the full text
of Carlin's performance and the subject words are set forth. FCC v. Pacifica Foundation,
98 S. Ct. 3026, 3041 app. (1978).
2 In re WBAI (FM), 56 F.C.C.2d 94 (1975).
3 98 S. Ct. at 3029.
4 Id. at 3041.
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